article and questions#

Bankers have been blaming themselves for their troubles in public. Behind the scenes, they have been taking aim at someone else: the accounting standard-setters. Their rules, moan the banks, have forced them to report enormous losses, and it’s just not fair. These rules say they must value some assets at the price a third party would pay, not the price managers and regulators would like them to fetch.

Unfortunately, banks’ lobbying now seems to be working. The details may be unknowable, but the independence of standard-setters, essential to the proper functioning of capital markets, is being compromised. And, unless banks carry toxic assets at prices that attract buyers, reviving the banking system will be difficult.

After a bruising encounter with Congress, America’s Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rushed through rule changes. These gave banks more freedom to use models to value illiquid assets and more flexibility in recognizing losses on long-term assets in their income statements. Bob Herz, the FASB’s chairman, cried out against those who “question our motives.” Yet bank shares rose and the changes enhance what one lobbying group politely calls “the use of judgment by management.”

European ministers instantly demanded that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) do likewise. The IASB says it does not want to act without overall planning, but the pressure to fold when it completes its reconstruction of rules later this year is strong. Charlie McCreevy, a European commissioner, warned the IASB that it did “not live in a political vacuum” but “in the real world” and that Europe could yet develop different rules.

It was banks that were on the wrong planet, with accounts that vastly overvalued assets. Today they argue that market prices overstate losses, because they largely reflect the temporary illiquidity of markets, not the likely extent of bad debts. The truth will not be known for years. But banks’ shares trade below their book value, suggesting that investors are skeptical. And dead markets partly reflect the paralysis of banks which will not sell assets for fear of booking losses, yet are reluctant to buy all those supposed bargains.

To get the system working again, losses must be recognized and dealt with. America’s new plan to buy up toxic assets will not work unless banks mark assets to levels which buyers find attractive. Successful markets require independent and even combative standard-setters. The FASB and IASB have been exactly that, cleaning up rules on stock options and pensions, for example, against hostility from special interests. But by giving in to critics now they are inviting pressure to make more concessions.

单词#

句子分析#

1. Behind the scenes, they have been taking aim at someone else: the accounting standard-setters.

   • 结构：take aim at（抨击） + 冒号引出对象
   • 功能：揭示银行公开自责背后的真实矛头（会计准则制定者）
   • 翻译：暗地里，他们一直在抨击别人：会计准则制定者。

2. It was banks that were on the wrong planet, with accounts that vastly overvalued assets.

   • 强调句：It was... that + 原因状语(with...)
   • 比喻义：on the wrong planet = 完全错误
   • 翻译：错得离谱的是银行，其账目严重高估了资产价值。

3. America’s new plan to buy up toxic assets will not work unless banks mark assets to levels which buyers find attractive.

   • 条件句：unless（除非） + 定语从句(which...)
   • 核心逻辑：资产定价须吸引买家，否则救市计划无效
   • 翻译：除非银行将资产定价调整到买家认为有吸引力的水平，否则美国收购不良资产的新计划将无效。

短语总结#

1. take aim at 抨击
   • 原文：taking aim at standard-setters
2. rush through 仓促通过
   • 原文：FASB rushed through rule changes
3. cry out against 强烈抗议
   • 原文：cried out against those who…
4. on the wrong planet 大错特错
   • 原文：banks were on the wrong planet
5. book value 账面价值
   • 原文：shares trade below their book value
6. mark to 定价为
   • 原文：mark assets to attractive levels
7. clean up rules 整顿规则
   • 原文：cleaning up rules on stock options
8. give in to 屈服于
   • 原文：by giving in to critics

全文翻译#

银行家们一直在公开场合将自身问题归咎于己。而私下里，他们却一直将矛头指向他人：会计准则制定者。银行抱怨道，这些规则迫使他们报告巨额亏损，这很不公平。规则要求银行必须以第三方愿意支付的价格评估部分资产，而非管理层和监管机构期望的售价。

不幸的是，银行的游说似乎正在奏效。细节尚不明确，但准则制定者的独立性——对资本市场正常运转至关重要的特质——正遭到侵蚀。除非银行以吸引买家的价格持有不良资产，否则银行体系的复苏将举步维艰。

在与国会激烈交锋后，美国财务会计准则委员会（FASB）仓促通过了准则修订。新规赋予银行更大自由度：可用模型评估非流动性资产，并在损益表中更灵活地确认长期资产损失。FASB 主席鲍勃·赫兹驳斥了那些”质疑我们动机”的人。然而银行股价应声上涨，这些改动被某游说团体客气地称为”管理层判断力的运用”。

欧洲各国部长立即要求国际会计准则委员会（IASB）效仿。IASB 表示不愿在没有全面规划的情况下行动，但压力巨大——当其今年晚些时候完成规则重构时，妥协似乎难以避免。欧盟专员查理·麦克里维警告 IASB：它并非”身处政治真空”，而是置身”现实世界”，欧洲可能另立一套准则。

问题根源在于银行的想法荒谬至极——其账目曾严重高估资产。如今他们辩称市场价格夸大了损失，因这些价格主要反映市场暂时流动性不足，而非坏账的真实程度。真相多年内恐难浮出水面。但银行股价低于账面价值，表明投资者持怀疑态度。此外，市场僵局部分源于银行的瘫痪：它们因害怕账面亏损不敢出售资产，却又拒绝买入那些所谓的廉价资产。

要让系统重新运转，必须承认并处理损失。美国收购不良资产的新计划若想奏效，银行必须将资产定价至吸引买家的水平。成功的市场需要独立甚至敢于斗争的准则制定者。FASB 和 IASB 过去正是如此——例如顶住特殊利益集团的压力，整顿了股票期权和养老金规则。但如今向批评者让步，只会招致更多妥协的压力。